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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Board2 1 is probably
the most important case in this area of the law decided by the
Supreme Court during the past term, but it need not be dis-
cussed in detail here. It, and the prior Duree case, 22 are the sub-
jects of an extended criticism appearing in a recent issue of the
Review. Further, both of these unfortunate cases have now been
overruled by a recent constitutional amendment. 24
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Melvin G. Dakin*
This term witnessed another chapter in the continuing ef-
forts of United Gas Corporation to be relieved of the alleged
confiscatory effects of rates fixed by franchise in its "Monroe
Division."' As to the franchise with the City of Monroe, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has effectively placed it beyond modi-
fication except with the consent of the City of Monroe by deci-
sions holding that the city rather than the Louisiana Public
Service Commission had regulatory power over rates and hold-
ing that the city, even though having such regulatory power,
was not bound to exercise it and could hold the utility to its
franchise despite alleged confiscatory effects.2
On an application amended to exclude the City of Monroe,
United Gas asked the Commission to fix new rates in the re-
mainder of the Monroe Division; the City of West Monroe, also
under franchise agreement, filed exceptions urging that the
Commission was without power to alter the franchise. The
Commission denied the application, holding the franchise to be
21. 238 La. 388, 115 So. 793 (1959).
22. Duree v. Maryland Casualty Company, 239 La. 166, 114 So.2d 594 (1959),
reversing Duree v. State, 96 So.2d 854 (La. App. 1957).
23. McMahon & Miller, The Crain Myth-A Criticism of the Duree and
Stephens Cases, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 449 (1960).
24. LA. CoNST. art. III, § 35, as amended on November 8, 1960, pursuant to
La. Acts 1960, No. 621.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. United Gas Corp. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 239 La. 368,
118 So.2d 442 (1960).
2. City of Monroe v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 233 La. 478, 97
So.2d 56 (1957), commented on in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Courtfor the 1957-1958 Term- Public Utilities, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 376
(1959).; United Gas Corp. v. City of Monroe, 236 La. 825, 109 So.2d 433 (1958),
commented on in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959
Term -Public Utilities, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 296 (1960); noted in 20
LOUISIANA LAW REvimw 624 (1960).
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a binding contract, but stated that "even if that contract did not
exist, the Commission should not fix gas rates in West Monroe
or in the remainder of the so-called Monroe District, until the
question of the rates in Monroe is settled."8
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
Commission's power to fix rates "lay in abeyance for the dura-
tion of the contract"; as to the City of West Monroe, the court
said, "[T]he Commission enjoys the exclusive compulsory rate
making power" and any attempt to divest such power by con-
tract would be an abridgement of the state police power. The
Commission was directed to exercise its jurisdiction; "if that
body does have the power to . . . act it is required to do so."4
On April 1, 1957, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied a re-
hearing in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission5 and the Commission order
therein affirmed was made final. On August 14, 1957, the utility
filed application for a new, permanent rate increase which would
yield net operating revenues of 7.5 percent on a property rate
base; it also asked for an emergency increase of $7,000,000
which would immediately increase rate of return to approxi-
mately 5.75 percent on a property rate base.6
In its new application, the utility gave no recognition to the
order just approved by the Louisiana Supreme Court; it made
no showing of inadequacy of such rates to provide a fair rate
of return on a capitalization with a 45 percent debt ratio and
the application of appropriate current earnings-price ratios to
the price paid for the utility common stock by its corporate
parent, as might have seemed required in light of the recently
approved order. Instead, the utility relied for its affirmative
case on comparing the achieved rate of return on a property base
under the reduced rates with the achieved return in other parts
of the Bell system and with achieved return in utilities na-
tionally. Basically, the view was taken that the distribution of
the utility capitalization between debt and equity capital was
irrelevant to the issue of just and reasonable rates; the duty
of the Commission was to grant the utility an increase if its
earnings failed to yield a rate of return on property comparable
3. 239 La. 368, 372, 118 So.2d 442, 443 (1960).
4. Id. at 377-78, 118 So.2d at 445-46.
5. 232 La. 446, 94 So.2d 431 (1957).
6. 38 La. P.S.C. Ann. Rep. 131, 132 (1958).
19611
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to the rate of such return achieved by other comparable enter-
prises. The Commission granted an increase of $1,900,000, ap-
plying the principles of "prudent investment-cost of capital" as
promulgated in its 1956 order. 7
On appeal8 the Louisiana Supreme Court did not reject the
"prudent investment-cost of capital" method as a framework
within which to fix just and reasonable rates, eloquent as were
the utility's arguments that only absurd and ridiculous results
could be achieved thereunder. In fact, the court accepted, in
principle, the upward adjustment of debt ratio as a proper pro-
cedure to realize for the subscriber the savings incident to lower
cost debt capital, both directly through interest rates below com-
mon stock required earnings and indirectly through tax savings
from interest deductions." According full review of law and
fact, the court even determined that 5 percent, rather than 4
percent, was the proper rate of interest on the additional debt
assumed. 10 The court also seemed tempted to make its own de-
termination of the appropriate rate of earnings for the common
stock but was diverted into comparative returns on a property
rate base. In passing, the court developed a view as to common
stock earnings hardly urged by the Commission that "while the
utility is entitled to earn a sufficient amount to acquire surplus,
that is not to say that it is entitled to earn a return on this
surplus." "Capital for growth and expansion," the court said,
"should be furnished by the investors, not by the rate payers.""
For quite different reasons, the Commission had allowed earn-
ings on the common stock which seemed to exclude surplus;
the Commission took as its earnings base the price paid by the
parent company, a price which had consistently been maintained
at par despite earnings and applicable earnings-price ratios
justifying a price higher than par.12 Probably sensing that this
was an area in which the court could not confidently substitute
its judgment, even on a full review of law and fact, the court
contented itself with quoting attacks on earnings-price ratios
as a determinative of the proper level of common stock earn-
ings; it then found that it was not "necessary in this case to
7. 36 La. P.S.C. Ann. Rep. 43, 69 (1956).
8. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Com-
mission, 239 La. 175, 118 So.2d 372 (1960).
9. Id. at 202-03, 118 So.2d at 382.
10. Ibid.
11. Id. at 211, 118 So.2d at 385.
12. 38 La. P.S.C. Ann. Rep. 131, 173 (1958).
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determine whether the earnings-price ratio formula used by the
Commission is sound or not.' 13 The court did not find that the
method was incapable of yielding just and reasonable results,
or even that the specific application in this case would not do so
if applied to all utilities similarly situated; it did find and
hold "that an earnings-price ratio of 6.75 per cent on a hypo-
thetical 55 per cent of common stock capital as applied to one
utility, while others similarly situated are earning 8.5 per cent
on equity capital and not less than 6 per cent on property rate
base, is discriminatory and for that reason is not just and rea-
sonable."'1
4
The difficulty with the court's disposition is that, in adopting
comparative return on a property base as a guide, it provided
no way of implementing the conclusion at which it had earlier
arrived, that tax savings resulting from a higher debt ratio
should be achieved by the utility, but with a reasonable time
allowed to adjust to such higher ratio. What the Commission
recognized was that a utility with only 22 percent debt is not
"similarly situated" with other utilities having 45 percent to
50 percent debt and that to grant 6 percent on a property base
to both is effectively to abandon any hope that they wil become
"similarly situated."'15 The tax savings of a higher debt ratio
will be realized only if common stockholders can thereby increase
their share of net operating revenue; if such tax savings are to
be shared by subscribers, compulsion may be the only means
of achieving them. Thus, the court might appropriately allow
somewhat less than 6 percent to a low debt utility, leaving the
full 6 percent to be achieved through tax savings realized by
greater reliance upon debt capital and the accompanying interest
deductions.' 6 The prudent investment-cost of capital method is
reduced to hollow mockery without this minimum sanction; the
sanction could have been provided by adding a bracketed inser-
tion in the court's mandate, thus: "The earnings-price ratio to
be applied to the hypothetical 55 per cent of capital represented
by common stock, should be so adjusted that the end result will
be a return of not less than 6 percent [after taking into account
tax savings incident to increasing debt ratio to 45 percent] on
13. 239 La. 175, 216, 118 So.2d 372, 387 (1960).
14. Id. at 227-28, 118 So.2d at 391-92.
15. 38 La. P.S.C. Ann. Rep. 131, 163-64 (1958).
16. 239 La. 175, 205-06, 118 So.2d 372, 383 (1960).
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the property rate base. ' 17 Something more than the form of
the method would have thus been preserved.
In a series of cases over the past several years, the Louisiana
Public Service Commission has sought to stem the tide of rail-
road station closings by practically requiring out-of-pocket loss
and almost negligible disturbance to public interest before ap-
proval.18 At this term, in Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Louisiana
Public Service Commission,9 the railroad demonstrated station
losses by attributing one-half of the revenues from in and out
freight to the station proposed to be closed and by prorating
system-wide expenses to it on the basis of the system ratio of
such expenses to revenue. Denying the application, the Com-
mission urged that all revenues, both in and out, should be
attributed to the station sought to be closed and that system-
wide expenses should not be prorated. 20 Both of these positions
were rejected by the court, quite properly it would seem, since
they are hardly plausible on their face as accounting procedures
and were supported by no expert accounting opinion from the
Commission or elsewhere.2 1 It seems regrettable that a decision
so plausible was not made at the administrative level.
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Robert L. Roland*
As far as the past term is concerned, students of state and
local taxation could possibly better spend their time elsewhere.
Although eight cases were decided, five of them were companion
cases and none of the cases, with the possible exception of one
use tax case, are of any lasting importance as points for future
reference and use.
Collector of Revenue, State of Louisiana v. John W. Olvey,
17. Id. at 299, 118 So.2d at 392.
18. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term
Public Utilities, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 294, 295-96 (1960); The Work of
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term - Administrative Law, 19
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 351, 361 (1959).
19. 238 La. 243, 115 So.2d 337 (1959).
20. Id. at 24647, 115 So.2d at 338-39.
21. Ibid.
*Member, Baton Rouge Bar; former Collector of Revenue for the State of
Louisiana; and Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University.
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